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Fn December 19.1991, President
Bush signed into law the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDIC1A), which Congress passed to ad-
dress problems it saw in the supervision
of federally insured banks. An important
component of FD1CIA that has already
received substantial public attention is
the set of provisions detailing a new
process for prompt corrective supervi-
sory action against undercapitalized
banks. Much more obscure, though per-
haps as innovative, are the sections of
the legislation that modify the terms and
conditions under which the Federal
Reserve Banks may lend to troubled
banks at the discount window.
Congress felt compelled to address dis-
count window administration in FDIC1A
because of its concern that, under certain
circumstances, discount window ad-
vances to troubled institutions could un-
necessarily increase taxpayers" cost when
the firms were eventually closed and liq-
uidated, or sold by the FDIC. Implicitly.
through the changes to discount window
administration imposed by FD1CIA.
Congress sought not only to clarify the
application of concepts like "too big to
fail." "systemic risk." and "lender of
last resort," but also to provide more
explicit guidance to the Federal Reserve
regarding the appropriate use of the dis-
count window in failing bank situa-
tions. The aim of this Economic Com-
mentary is to describe the evolution of
supervisory policy toward failing banks
over the last 20 years or so. with par-
ticular emphasis on the role of Federal
Reserve Banks in their capacity as
"lenders of last resort."
• Background
A regulatory closing or other failure
resolution effectively constitutes official
recognition of a depository institution's
economic insolvency. Typically, as many
as three agencies could be involved in a
bank shutdown: the chartering agency,
the FDIC, and any Federal Reserve Bank
from which the institution might have
borrowed prior to closing.
Although the Federal Reserve's formal
role in the closing is passive, it may
precipitate this action by demanding
repayment of its advances. If the bor-
rower cannot repay the advances upon
demand, the chartering agency (the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency
|OCC) for national banks) declares the
bank insolvent and appoints the FDIC
either as a receiver outright or as
operator of a bridge bank, a kind of
conservatorship under the FDIC's con-
trol.' If there is a Federal Reserve ad-
vance, it is either repaid at once or ar-
rangements are made for deferred
payment by the FDIC. In a liquidation,
the insured depositors are paid off in
full, followed by the secured creditors.
The uninsured depositors and other
general and subordinated creditors are
paid back in full if sufficient funds are
available, but they are at risk of receiv-
ing only a partial payback. The stock-
holders stand last in line for the receipt
of liquidation funds.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA) made potentially the most
significant statutory alterations in the
Federal Reserve System's discount win-
dow lending regime in nearly 50 years.
FDICIA restricts the Reserve Banks
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authority to lend to undercapitalized
depository institutions in order to ad-
dress issues raised by the "too-big-to-
fair doctrine surrounding rescues of
uninsured claimants on insolvent
banks. In addition, the new legislation
provides explicit guidance to the FDIC
on the status of uninsured claims under
the systemic risk doctrine.
ISSN (W2N-1276This simplified model of a bank closing
began to evolve into more complicated
forms nearly 20 years ago, when the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
made a large, prolonged advance to
Franklin National Bank of New York
to facilitate its orderly closing in 1974.
In the Franklin case, the Reserve Bank
acted as a lender of last resort because
no other institution was willing to incur
the risk of nonpayment at par by lend-
ing substantial sums to Franklin on an
unsecured basis."
Subsequently, the too-big-to-fail doctrine
evolved from federal bank regulators'
actions in dealing with large, troubled
financial institutions, roughly since the
failure and rescue of Continental Illinois
of Chicago in 1984. This doctrine gen-
erally holds that some banks, because of
either their size and correspondent bank-
ing relationships (the case for Continen-
tal) or their importance in key regional or
international financial markets (possibly
the case for both the Bank of New Eng-
land of Boston [ 1991 ] and the National
Bank of Washington [1990]), should not
be liquidated with less than full pay-
ment of liabilities, including uninsured
liabilities.' Formally, too-big-to-fail
decisions are made by the FDIC, not
the Federal Reserve, but the Federal
Reserve's participation in some large
failure resolutions has allowed it to
play a significant role in implementing
this doctrine. In any case, neither
"lender of last resort" nor "too big to
fail" is a statutorily defined term guid-
ing Federal Reserve policies — these
phrases do not appear in the Federal
Reserve Act.
In some instances, especially involving
some recent failures of large banks, in-
stitutions do not have sufficient assets
to cover both the repayment of their
Federal Reserve advances and the
liabilities owed to all other claimants
(except stockholders and subordinated
creditors). Some of the uninsured
claimants might suffer losses if the too-
big-to-fail doctrine were not invoked.
If the doctrine were invoked, however,
the FDIC might need to use its own
resources to pay off the uninsured par-
ties fully. It is easy to see that the larger
the failing bank's capital in proportion
to its assets, and the more quickly the
bank is closed upon recognition of its
failure, the less likely it is that the
FDIC would need to provide its own
funds for a troubled bank resolution.
A record number of banks have failed
since Continental Illinois, exhausting the
capacity of the FDIC's bank insurance
fund (BIF) to repay even the insured de-
positors beyond the reserves already pro-
vided for expected future losses. The BIF
also has had to absorb losses suffered by
an unusually large number of uninsured
claimants who have received settlements
under the too-big-to-fail doctrine.
Eventually, after Congress became
faced with the need to provide finan-
cial backing for the BIF during 1991, it
began to reconsider the process by
which bank failures were handled by
the supervisory agencies. As part of its
inquiry. Congress questioned the role
of discount window advances in failure
resolutions. Supervisory forbearance
regarding the closure of large banks
was thought to have contributed to
their ability to take greater risks and to
operate with less capital than the
market would have tolerated in the ab-
sence of the forbearance.
Congress also was concerned about pos-
sible inequities in the availability of dis-
count window borrowings in failing bank
situations. Small banks have complained
that reducing the coverage of deposit in-
surance would drive depositors away
from them and into the largest banks, be-
cause generally only large banking organ-
izations were thought to be too big to fail.
Although there apparently had been a
tendency for the FDIC to extend too-big-
to-fail treatment to ever-smaller banks,
eroding market discipline further, depos-
itors and other uninsured creditors of the
smallest banks have never really felt
equally treated by the regulatory process
of resolving bank failures.
• Discount Window Administration
Prior to FDICIA
Loans to banks through the Federal
Reserve Banks' discount windows gen-
erally take three forms: seasonal loans,
typically to small agricultural banks;
short-term adjustment loans, when a
temporary reserve deficiency cannot be
met in the national funds market: and
extended credit, when a bank no longer
has normal access to the funds market and
needs time to find alternative sources.
Most of the academic and congressional
concern that has been expressed about
the appropriateness of discount window
loans pertains to the use of extended
credit, especially when advances are
outstanding for prolonged periods.
6
A traditional view of the lender-of-last-
resort function, one that in fact pre-
vailed at the Board of Governors
before 1970 or so, would have avoided
continuous borrowings by member
banks from the Reserve Banks, even to
provide liquidity to failing or insolvent
banks prior to their resolutions. The
reason is that such borrowings in effect
would have constituted use of Federal
Reserve credit as a substitute for the
member banks' capital for the duration
of the advances. A theoretically and
traditionally appropriate provision of
Reserve Bank credit in bank failures is
the extension of advances to other sol-
vent banks holding claims on the fail-
ing banks.
Banking conditions changed somewhat
during the 1970s from their post-
Depression norms. Many banks, espe-
cially large ones, became more active
internationally and developed exten-
sive interbank correspondent relation-
ships. Moreover, the economy suffered
two strong recessions, inflation and in-
terest rates spiraled. and bank capital
positions deteriorated. When Franklin
National Bank found itself unable to
maintain prior funding sources in 1974,
the FDIC and the Federal Reserve em-
barked on a sizable and protracted res-
cue operation. From that time forward,
it could be said that federal banking
regulators began to think of discount
window extended credit as an essential
tool to maintain the liquidity of insol-
vent or failing banks, though it was
several more years before such a situa-
















An insured depository institution significantly exceeds the
required minimum level for each relevant capital measure
An insured depository institution meets the required mini-
mum level for each relevant capital measure
An insured depository institution fails to meet the required
minimum for any relevant capital measure
An insured depository institution is significantly below the
required minimum for any relevant capital measure
An insured depository institution fails to meet any specified
capital measure
ultimate cost of liquidating or selling
the bank to the FDIC. The loss arises
because discount window advances
could be used repeatedly to replace
withdrawn private funds, leaving an in-
sufficient pool of sound collateral to
cover eventual payments to the insured
and uninsured claimants who remain in
the bank. Arguably, a faster closure,
prompted by a refusal of Federal
Reserve discount window credit,
would make more of the bank's good
assets available at the time of liquida-
tion or sale. "
Even before the failure of Continental
Illinois in 1984 made bank rescue pol-
icy a matter of public debate, it was
generally acknowledged that regulators
behaved as though they either already
were or properly ought to be authorized
to rescue fully the uninsured claimants
on banks whose failure would pose un-
due risks to the U.S. banking system.
Although the FDIC Act was amended
in 1982 to provide the agency with ex-
plicit authority to lend to open insured
banks to prevent their defaults or
"when severe financial conditions exist
which threaten the stability of a sig-
nificant number of insured depository
institutions or of insured depository in-
stitutions possessing significant finan-
cial resources" and the loans are made
"to lessen the risk to the [FDIC]...
posed by such insured depository in-
stitution[s] under such threat of insta-
bility," the Federal Reserve Banks'
comparable lending authority has never
been codified specifically.' Neverthe-
less, the Federal Reserve's participa-
tion in the resolution of large or "impor-
tant" bank failures has been explained
as an essential bulwark against the
spread of this "systemic risk" in the
banking system.''
Another innovation in Federal Reserve
lending practice since the mid-1970s is
that, as with Franklin National (1974),
Continental Illinois (1984), a few large
Texas bank failures in 1988-89, and the
failures of the Bank of New England and
James Madison Limited of Washington,
D.C. (both in early 1991), the Federal
Reserve Banks also refrained from
demanding that the FDIC, in its corpo-
rate capacity, repay outstanding ad-
vances, even after the failed entities
were seized. " In those cases, the FDIC
eventually repaid the Federal Reserve's
advances, including $3.5 billion repaid
over five years for Continental Illinois
(the largest amount and the longest for-
bearance). Federal Reserve credit to the
FDIC enabled that agency to conserve its
cash at the time, but it did not reduce or
cancel the FDIC's obligation to repay the
advance ultimately.
The Reserve Banks' forbearances for the
FDIC or advances to the FDIC's bridge
banks (a type of successor entity occa-
sionally administered by the FDIC when
there is no acquiring bank at the time of
seizure of a failing bank) apparently have
not increased the final amount of ad-
vances outstanding at failure. In principle,
bridge banks can be created in which
uninsured depositors are not made whole,
and the FDIC's assumptions of outstand-
ing Reserve Bank advances need not in-
fluence the agency's decisions regarding
the standing of uninsured depositors in a
failure resolution. But defenders of the
more restrictive, traditional view of dis-
count window lending argue that lender-
of-last-resort advances to support the sol-
vency (capital replacement) of, or to
delay the closing of, insolvent banks are
simply another way for regulators to ex-
tend de facto guarantees to uninsured
depositors and other creditors of the firm.
In effect, these advances allow such
claimants to get their money out of the
bank at full value, thereby increasing the
Determining whether the Federal
Reserve's use of extended credit in fail-
ing bank cases materially aided or
harmed the public good is problematic,
because there are no clear efficiency
standards against which the effort can
be evaluated. Studying the history of
the Federal Reserve's advances during
June 1991, the House Banking Com-
mittee concluded that, during the six
years covered (1985-90), the Reserve
Banks had made advances of extended
credit to approximately 500 banks,
with roughly 90 percent of those institu-
tions eventually failing during that
period.
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4 During May and June 1991,
Congress began to consider measures
to provide more specific guidance
regarding regulators' attempts to pro-
vide full coverage of uninsured
claimants on failed banks, with par-
ticular attention paid to the too-big-to-
fail and systemic risk doctrines.
• FDICIA's Discount
Window Provisions
The discount window provisions of
FDICIA are particularly significant
when considered in the context of the
Act's other provisions, especially those
pertaining to prompt corrective action.
FDICIA mandates a set of capital
strength categories for banks and re-
quires bank supervisors to take progres-
sively stricter actions against banks as
their capital positions deteriorate (see
box). These actions are designed to
encourage management and policy
changes at banks before failure be-
comes imminent. As the federal bank
supervisory agencies implement prompt
corrective action, the risk of eventualloss to either the Federal Reserve or the
FDIC should be reduced even if the
bank is subsequently closed and liqui-
dated or merged. Some observers, for
good reason, consider the specifications of
prompt corrective action to be FDICIA's
heart and soul, although it remains to
be seen how the statute's language is
actually put into practice.
FDICIA's discount window reforms, in
Congress' view, add another layer of
taxpayer protection in troubled bank
resolutions by restricting the terms and
condition's under which advances may
be used to assist banks with weak capi-
tal positions and by forcing more public
accountability on all of the regulators
involved in such operations. Formally,
the new discount window provisions
do not become effective until Decem-
ber 19, 1993, two years after enact-
ment. However, at the time FDICIA
was passed, the House Banking Com-
mittee observed that the Federal Re-
serve had already altered its practices
regarding extended credit.15
Section 141 of FDICIA essentially limits
the too-big-to-fail doctrine and also for-
malizes procedures for recognizing sys-
temic risk exceptions to those limits. Ef-
fective January 1, 1995. the FDIC is
explicitly prohibited from using its funds
to pay off more than the insured amount
of deposits and from paying creditors
other than depositors.'
6 Section 312 of
FDICIA immediately prohibits the use of
FDIC funds to repay at par depositors at
foreign offices of U.S. banks, subject to
exceptions for systemic risk and the early
resolution provisions of Section 143.
However, Section 312 (c) also explicitly
permits Reserve Banks to make advances
that might be used to repay such foreign
depositors as long as other applicable re-
quirements of Section 142 are satisfied.
The systemic risk doctrine is a compar-
atively recent concern of regulators and
is linked in most discussions to inter-
bank exposure and the too-big-to-fail
doctrine.
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7 An exception to the FDlC's
least-cost resolution procedures that
might affect the discount window lim-
itations of FDICIA was included in Sec-
tion 141 for "systemic risk." In this
context, a regulatory determination that
failure to repay uninsured claims of in-
sured institutions at par "would have
serious adverse effects on economic
conditions or financial stability" is re-
quired to suspend the specified proce-
dures for least-cost resolution. This
determination is based on criteria that
reflect but are potentially broader than
the prior criteria for FDIC open-bank
assistance.
The systemic risk exception—Section
141(a)(l)(G)—was included in the
least-cost resolution section of FDICIA
to provide regulatory flexibility to
avoid redemption of uninsured claims
at less than par in cases that the regula-
tors believe might cause generalized
financial instability. Congress restricted
the exercise of this discretion by requir-
ing that the Secretary of the Treasury
(in consultation with the President) de-
termine that "action or assistance"
under this exception "would avoid or
mitigate" the "adverse effects" of the
failure of each institution for which the
exception is invoked. Requests for the
systemic risk exception may be initiated
by either the FDIC or the Board, but
they must be approved by two-thirds of
the FDIC's Board of Directors and two-
thirds of the Board of Governors.
Section 141 also requires the FDIC to
recover losses arising from the use of
the systemic risk exception by a special
assessment against all members of the
appropriate fund (either the BIF or the
Savings Association Insurance Fund).
Thus, BIF members will have an inter-
est in preventing unwarranted use of
the exception because each surviving
insured bank must pay for supervisors'
decisions to guarantee the claims of
uninsured creditors at par. The Secre-
tary of the Treasury is required to docu-
ment the regulators' decisions on sys-
temic risk and to submit detailed
reports to both the Senate and House
Banking Committees.
FDICIA extensively revised and renum-
bered former Section 10(b) of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act. The new section
limits Reserve Bank advances to under-
capitalized institutions to no more than 60
days in any 120-day period. This re-
striction may be overridden only if the
Reserve Bank receives advance written
certification of the borrower's viability
from the head of its principal federal su-
pervisory authority or if, following an
examination of the borrower by the
Federal Reserve, the Chairman of the
Board certifies in writing to the Reserve
Bank that the borrower is viable.
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Section 142 of FDICIA alters the bor-
rowing regime for undercapitalized in-
stitutions (Groups 3-5; see box) as fol-
lows: Group 3 or 4 institutions may
borrow from Reserve Banks for only
60 days in any 120-day period. Group
5 institutions may borrow for only five
days. The Board of Governors may
authorize advances in excess of the 60-
day limit for Group 3 or 4 institutions
by treating them like Group 5 institu-
tions and by agreeing to bear any ex-
cess loss arising from continuation of
the advances beyond the five-day limit
that applies to Group 5 institutions.
The Board (not the Reserve Banks—at
least, not directly) must repay losses
arising from advances to Group 5 in-
stitutions beyond the five-day limit to
the FDIC, with its liability calculated
as the lesser of the incremental amount
advanced after the five-day period and
the interest received by the Reserve
Banks on those advances. The Board
must report its losses under new Sec-
tion 10B(b) to Congress within six
months after they are incurred."
• Concluding Observations
The discount window provisions of
FDICIA elaborated a new design for the
Federal Reserve's part of the bank failure
resolution process by providing explicit
guidance and limits on the use of Reserve
Banks' advances. The general thrust of
these provisions is to tighten the lending
criteria for undercapitalized institutions
and to specify procedures that must be
used for advances to these institutions.21
If regulators wish to invoke systemic
risk exceptions to the new least-cost
resolutions regime, FDICIA has estab-
lished exacting and publicly account-
able procedures for those exceptions,
which previously were only remotelyaccountable to the political process.
FDICIA did not settle definitively the
policy debate on the too-big-to-fail and
systemic risk doctrines, together with
other aspects of the theory of the lender
of last resort, but it certainly has nar-
rowed the scope of actions that
regulators may take solely within their
own discretion.
• Footnotes
1. Most failing banks do not have Reserve
Banks' advances outstanding at the closing;
thus. Reserve Banks arc not necessary parties
at most closings.
2. See generally Sperof 1980) and In re
Franklin National Bank. 381 F. Supp. 1390
(E.D.N.Y.), 1974.
3. The uncertainty surrounding the role of
the too-big-to-fail doctrine in the failure
resolution process for the Bank of New
England and National Bank of Washington
arises from the fact that, at the time (1990-
91). regulators were not required officially to
announce that they were invoking it.
4. See, for example. U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (1991 b), pp. 29-39.
5. See analogous remarks of Senate Banking
Committee Chairman Donald Riegle upon in-
troducing the first Senate version of FDICIA,
5. 543. on March 5. 1991 (Congressional
Record [ 1991 ], p. S2639). Comparable
statements also appear in U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives (1991a), pp. 15-18,22-23. and
(1991b). pp. 29-39.
6. See Schwartz (1992). U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (1991c). p. 94. and Garsson (1991).
7. Both Schwartz (1992), pp. 61-65. and
Hackley (1973), p. 194. discuss such histori-
cal operation of the discount window. Hack-
ley notes, citing language then in Regulation
A (but later dropped in 1980). that "ordinary"
unavailability of Federal Reserve credit for
extended periods would not preclude such
credit "to assist member banks in emergency
situations." but that language was not demon-
strated to have been aimed solely or primarily
at loans in situations where the borrower's
eventual failure was probable or certain. See
also footnote 8, below.
8. See the discussions in Todd (1988, 1992),
Hetzel (1991). Schwartz (1992). and Mayer
(1992). pp. 260-325. Federal Reserve Regu-
lation A, 12 C.F.R. Section 201.5(a) (1992),
provides as follows: "Credit for Capital Pur-
poses. Federal Reserve credit is not a substi-
tute for capital." Schwartz (1992), p. 59,
describes the increased use of Reserve Banks'
advances of extended credit to failing banks
as a blurring of the distinction between
- liquidity and solvency. See also, on this
point, U.S. House of Representatives
(199 lc), p. 94, and Garsson (1991).
9. See Zweig( 1985), pp. 373,396. and
Sprague (1986), pp. 252-55.
10. 12 U.S.C. Section 1823 (c)(l)(1992).
These two conditions on FDIC open-bank as-
sistance ("significant number" and "signifi-
cant financial resources") apparently are
embryonic forms of the systemic risk and too-
big-to-fail rationales, respectively.
11. In regard to regulators' emerging sys-
temic risk or contagion concerns, see Spero
(1980), Sprague (1986), pp. 77-106, Todd
and Thomson (1990). and Kaufman (1992).
12. See Schwartz (1992), pp. 63-64. and
In re Franklin National Bank. 381 F. Supp.
1390 (E.D.N.Y.), 1974.
13. See Thomson (1990), p. 34. For a sim-
ilar view of FDIC failure resolution policies
prior to the implementation of prompt correc-
tive action under FDICIA. see Caliguire and
Thomson (1987). However, for a thorough
explanation and sympathetic view of the
FDIC's procedures for deciding whether and
how to close failing banks prior to FDICIA,
see Bovenzi and Muldoon (1990). For a de-
scription of how the FDIC's procedures were
applied in the Perm Square case (1982). until
recently the largest payoff of an insured
bank, see Zweig (1985). pp. 371-74.
14. U.S. Houseof Representatives(1991c).
p. 94, Garsson (1991). and Schwartz (1992).
pp. 58-59.65.
15. The House Banking Committee's legis-
lative history report on FDICIA notes that
"The Federal Reserve currently [written in
November 1991] maintains a policy of not
extending credit to nonviable depository insti-
tutions. The Committee expects the Federal
Reserve to adhere to this policy and refrain
from making advances to institutions in situa-
tions where the Federal Reserve would likely
suffer a loss on the loan." (U.S. House of
Representatives [1991c], p. 105).
16. This general rule gives rise, however, to
some significant logical inferences. An anony-
mous referee of this Commentary paraphrased
those inferences quite well, as follows:
In instances where critically undercapital-
ized institutions are resolved without loss
to the FDIC, all general creditors ob-
viously will receive full value. Moreover,
where losses are experienced. [Section
141 (a)(l)(E)(iii)]... gives the FDIC
latitude to fully protect uninsured deposi-
tors in resolutions that take the form of
[purchase and assumption transactions]
... which cost the FDIC no more than if
the institution had been liquidated.
17. See. for example. Greenspan (1991), pp.
433-34. Todd and Thomson (1990). and Kauf-
man (1992) for discussions on these topics. I
have been unable to find explicit references to
"systemic risk" in the pre-Corainental Illinois
(1984) period.
18. The new section was renumbered
10B(b) under Section 142 of FDICIA.
19. These certifications are renewable for
additional 60-day periods, but the authority
to do so cannot be delegated by the head of
the appropriate supervisory authority.
20. In practice, the Board would repay
those losses by special assessments for its ex-
penses on the Reserve Banks. See Section
10(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
21. The House Banking Committee's legis-
lative history report (U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives [ 1991c], p. 105) states explicitly
that Section 141 of FDICIA "abolished" the
too-big-to-fail doctrine, but perhaps this is
too strong a conclusion.• References
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